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Abstract
This paper focuses on the genesis of corporate actors - an upward transfer
of decision-making rights and control functions within member-created
organizations. It argues that the formation of oligarchies and oligarchic
corporatization - as envisaged by Robert Michels - are both far more
problematic than it is usually assumed, while member-activated corporatiza-
tion is an often encountered phenomenon, which, however, does not exhaust
all the possible routes to corporatization. Among those the paper singles out
corporatization achieved through cross-system coalitions for closer inspec-
tion. The final section shows how different corporate structures, once in
place, shape intercorporate interactions and thwart organizational goal-
realization, thus spurring on further corporatization.
* * * * *
Dieses Diskussionspapier betrachtet die Entstehung korporativer Akteure im
Sinne des Transfers von Entscheidungs- und Kontrollfunktionen innerhalb
von Mitgliederorganisationen. Es argumentiert, daß die Bildung von Oligar-
chien und oligarchischer Korporatisierung - wie von Robert Michels postu-
liert - weit problematischer sind als generell angenommen. Dagegen ist
Mitlieder-aktivierte Korporatisierung ein häufig zu beobachtendes Phänomen,
wenngleich damit nicht alle möglichen Wege der Korporatisierung ausge-
schöpft sind. Von diesen konzentriert sich das Papier auf Korporatisierung
durch intersystemische Koalitionen. Im letzten Teil wird gezeigt, wie
unterschiedliche korporative Strukturen interkorporative Interaktionen
strukturieren und organisatorische Zielverwirklichung vereiteln, was schließ-
lich weitere Korporatisierung provoziert.
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Introduction
This paper is concerned with the genesis of corporate actors. Its
central focus is on the preconditions of a successful corporatization
process - an upward transfer of decision-making rights and control
functions within member-created organizations - making for the
emergence of a corporate actor. It is their capacity to transform
themselves from a "mere" set of formal organizational rules into
corporate actors, endowed with a capacity to act and acting indepen-
dently from the intentions and interests of their creators1 that consti-
tutes a source of recurring scholarly fascination (Bovens 1990; Carney
1987; Coleman 1974; Hood 1986; Kenis/ Schneider 1987; Mayntz 1986;
Perrow 1989; Schneider/ Werle 1990; Teubner 1987). For the crux of
the matter is not so much who establishes a corporation or that it is
established,2 but that it at some point becomes an autonomous actor
which defies the intentions of its creator(s).
The processes which lead to a successful corporatization and, by the
same token, to the emergence of an autonomous corporate actor, are
still rather feebly understood. For long scholars took organizational
genesis for granted.3 Recent scholarship, in contrast, tries to under-
1 Another key concern in studies of corporations is with their
ability not only to supply new and more benefits, but also to impose
costs of their activities on the third parties, while avoiding taking
responsibility for the consequences of their actions and for what they
define as "externalities."
2 Corporations, understood as a very special type of formal
organization, can be created by a private owner, a government
mandate or a member-based collectivity. The act of formal creation
of a corporation, embodied in a legal contract, is interesting insofar
as it clarifies for what purposes such a corporation was created and
to what extent, if any, the creating principals intended to control the
managing agents and the organization they established. It is a back-
drop, as it were, against which the subsequent deviations from the
original intentions of the founder(s) can be studied.
3 Weber-inspired organizational sociology does not focus on
the origins but rather on the characteristics and the interrelations
among the characteristics of complex organizations (Meyer 1978: 12-
13). Parsons-, Luhmann- and Buckley-inspired organizational soci-
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stand even this aspect of organizational dynamics, but does so in
terms of economic or organizational rationality.4 It treats organizations
as cognitive and strategic systems. It is mute on the theme of organi-
zations as complex actors who through their interactions create,
destroy, and block the emergence of corporate actors within their own
as well as other organizations. Since this paper adopts the actor-
structure perspective, which treats organizations as complex actors, it
is methodologically more compatible with the Michels-inspired studies
than with the core of organizational theory in sociology which ex-
plains organizational genesis and transformation in terms of overall
system needs, interorganizational adaptation, or organizational ration-
ality. But, in substantive terms, this paper and the Michels-inspired
studies are incompatible. In these studies of member-created corpora-
tions, the Michels’ thesis has been part of taken-for-granted wisdom
(Coleman 1974; Schneider/ Werle 1990). They work with the twin-
assumptions that the presence of an oligarchy or of vested bureau-
cratic interests explains deviations of organizational purposes from
those originally intended by their creators. It is against this assump-
tion that the main part of this paper, which takes departure from the
Michels’ thesis, turns.
Corporate actors will here be defined as those organized actors which
participate directly in (policy-oriented) decision-making, are formal
organizations, have a real constitution and a real membership, pur-
port to represent the interests of their membership, but often have
been challenged for misrepresenting these interests by both internal
and external critics, and, therefore, can be said to also pursue autono-
mous, member-independent interests. Their decisions result in the
establishment, maintenance and transformation of rule regimes. The
ology assumes that system or environment needs not only help to
structure organizations but also account for the organizational gene-
sis (Wohler 1978). The March and Simon classic on organizational
decision-making, finally, starts with considering the significance not
the genesis of organizations (March/ Simon 1958).
4 Recent studies of the dynamics of organizational populations
(the population ecology and the transaction cost approach) explain
organizational restructuring but do so in organizational or economic
terms (Meyer 1978: 13-14).
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first part of this paper presents the four polar factors constitutive of
corporate actor phenomenon -formal constitution, membership, inter-
est-representation and -generation, and rule regime making, but it
also provides reasons for why these definitional requirements should
be relaxed to include even such actors which only possess an infor-
mal constitution or a "presumed" membership.
1. Present-day Definitions of the Corporate Actor Concept
Before the major argument is presented, it is necessary to answer the
question what or who is a corporate actor, not the least because those
who so far have used and advanced this concept do not provide a
clear definition. Although no single definition is in fact possible -
how definitions are slanted depends to a great extent on the research
needs in question - what is possible, however, is a specification of a
number of criteria which help to distinguish corporate actors from
noncorporate actors. These criteria, I would argue, are constitutive in
a sense that they reflect the real-life polar factors determining the
phenomenon corporate actor. These constitutive criteria or polar
factors allow to establish a field which captures the spectrum of
varied organizational forms which, as I will argue, can be treated
legitimately as corporate actors. In reviewing some current corporate
actor definitions, I simultaneously clear the ground for setting these
criteria up.
In what follows I present three different definitions of corporate actor.
These definitions all have their legitimate basis in J.S. Coleman’s
Power and Structure of Society (Coleman 1974) which amounts to
saying that Coleman’s original definition is sufficiently multilayered
as to leave much room for subsequent variations in interpretative
stresses.
The broadest definition of corporate actor equates it with all formal
organizations (Scott 1981). By this definition state bureaucracies,
industrial firms, service agencies, professional organizations, political
clubs, mass organizations, but even a mail order house and your
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friendly neighborhood bakery become a study object. As juristic
persons, they possess both rights and resources, and pursue "corpo-
rate" interests which cannot be equated with aggregated member
interests. Moreover, "they can take actions, utilize resources, enter
into contracts, and own property" (Scott 1981: 6, 137, 313, 315). This
definition is not sufficiently discriminating. If accepted, it would leave
us helplessly confronted with the task of analyzing the entire "orga-
nized society," which, given the high organizational density in the
West, would amount to studying almost the entire society.
A more focused definition of corporate actor equates it with formal
organizations that participate in decision-making (Mayntz 1986: 18-
22). This definition of corporate actors stresses the constitutional
element which "defines their legitimate domain, potential membership,
and operational rules ..." (Mayntz 1986: 19). Even though this defini-
tion is more focused, it still is problematic,5 since it puts mass organi-
zations and government bureaucracies on an equal footing, although
they differ in their structure and internal dynamics. For example, by
this definition Central Banks, state ministries and even advisory
expert commissions established by a government mandate or appoint-
ment and not supposed to carry out "representative functions" become
corporate actors although they derive neither their authority nor their
resources from a membership the way mass organizations, such as
trade unions or political parties, do. The second, equally important
and problematic, implication of this definition is that it would exclude
from among corporate actors those actors who either participate in
decision-making and/or occupy space in a policy system, but lack a
formal organization or a constitution. These types of actors - lobbies
or social movements, for example - would fall beyond the cut-off
point of a spectrum of organizations that could also be considered
corporate actors.
5 This definition, although not so intended, seems to empha-
size policy-oriented decision-making and policy networks. Such an
emphasis would not be sufficiently discriminating as it would imply
corporate actor settings encompassing even the fragmented issue
networks which often include hundreds of policy-participants among
focal policy systems (Jordan 1981: 106).
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A differently slanted, although still policy-focused, definition of
corporate actor stresses the tense internal relationship between the
corporate actor and its individual members arising in connection with
its chartered task of collective "interest-representation" (Schneider/
Werle 1990). The task of collective "interest-representation" is indeed
a very frequent reason for creating corporate actors. However, and
this is exactly what this article problematizes, once individual actors
create a corporate actor - vest authority and resources in it and
entrust it with the right to represent them, to act and negotiate in
their name - this actor usurps new competences, mobilizes new
resources and engages in new fields of activity in pursuit of its own
interest in survival and power. In pursuing its self-interest, a corpo-
rate actor "ignores the interests of certain members or even acts
against these interests," but also plays an active role in identifying
and formulating new "corporate" interests which cannot be attributed
or reduced to those of the membership (Schneider/ Werle 1990: 78-
82). Indeed, in this definition the most important characteristic of a
corporate actor is that it is an autonomous generator of interests. It
makes the tension between corporate actor and its founding members
of paramount concern and, by the same token, poses both member
and corporate interests as focal. Given this focus, it is possible to
include even social movements, often lacking a formal constitution,
but nevertheless interested in power, contributing to decision-making
and subject to tension between the represented and member interests,
among corporate actors. What is problematic with this definition,
however, is the assumption that the corporate interest is the driving
power behind the usurpation of power by a corporate actor. As I
show in section 2, reality is more multifaceted than it is here pro-
posed: a corporate actor may indeed engage in power usurpation
strategies, but it may so do on internal or external demand.
A fourth constitutive component can be derived from Schneider and
Werle, but also Burns and Flam, although their focus is not on
corporate actors (Burns/ Flam 1987; see also Aldrich 1979: 69 and
Carney 1987: 344). This component is rule regime making and rule
regime transformation which constitute typical corporate actor activi-
ties (see section 1.2). These regimes define and protect domain
boundaries, assumptions, and identities and designate actors and rules
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operating in a domain.6 Moreover, they set up distributional and
interactional rules which rank-order domain-actors and induce them
to interest- and sub-identity-based coalition-formation, acting for and
against the stabilization of these rules.7 In fact, corporate power and
rule regimes are intrinsically connected and dependent on each other.
A corporate actor set signifies, stands for, backs and is backed by a
certain rule regime. Changes in this set signal that a rule regime
transformation is underway and vice versa.8
In sum, it takes a formal constitution, real membership, interest (mis)-
representation, member-independent interest generation, and rule
regime making to constitute a corporate actor defined. But, what has
been said so far has been meant to instill doubt as to whether a
corporate actor should necessarily have both a constitution and a
membership or just be a formal organization participating in decision-
making policy networks. To phrase this more succinctly the question
is if a corporate actor concept should be very narrow or very broad
- an umbrella concept, in fact. Should it refer only to corporate actors
who emerge from below, on the initiative of members to help them
achieve goals they could not otherwise realize and provide them with
benefits they could not otherwise accrue? In this case, only member-
6 Even noncorporate actors are involved in interest representa-
tion, interest identification, goal setting, means-allocation, organiza-
tional design, various types of interactions as well as in the planning
and executing of strategic moves. However, only in the case of
corporate actors both interest-and strategy-related activities are
oriented towards the acquisition and maintenance of (political) power
and have the purpose of setting up, maintaining or transforming rule
regimes.
7 This criterion directs our attention to neo-corporatist bargain-
ing structures, iron triangles and nuclei of policy communities, and
facilitates the analysis of both power distribution in and exclusion
rules by which corporate actors structure access within and to dif-
ferent (policy-oriented) decision-making systems (Jordan 1981: 107-
108).
8 Those corporate actors which participate in policy-making
have a chance of securing a formal-legal not only a normative-regu-
lative status for the rule regimes backing their power. Therefore, they
are also best placed to defend their power positions.
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created organizations which seek political power and contribute to
policy-making would be the "true" corporate actors. Or should the
concept refer to these member-created organizations, but also to those
corporate actors who emerge from above, created by a rule of law or
by virtue of possessed and vested economic resources, and meant
primarily to assist the creator in the task of controlling others? In
such a case, the concept would cover not only member-organizations,
but also government institutions and private corporations which seek
political power and contribute to rule-regime-creating policy-making.
Faced with these two alternative corporate actor concepts, I have
opted for the argument that the second conceptual strategy is more
promising, although not unproblematic. Consequently, in the next
section, using empirical examples, I will argue that neither a constitu-
tion, as a legal contract or document, nor a real membership should
be considered as necessary constitutive elements. What is required
instead - even of formal organizations participating in a decision-
making process by a government appointment or mandate - is that
they act as if they had a real membership and, therefore, attempt to
carry out representative functions, again, as if they had a formal
mandate from its membership to do so. What is also required is that
these representational functions are carried out in such a way that it
is possible to attribute a degree of autonomy to a corporate actor - to
identify interests, but also actions, which it generates independently
and which cannot be reduced to those of the (constitution-formulat-
ing) membership: a corporate actor should have as the primary
reference point either its real or presumed membership, and engage
in such activities as (own) interest identification in addition to interest
representation. When these definitional requirements are met, even
representatives of movements with no formal constitution and of
government bureaucracies with no "real" membership can be seen as
corporate actors when they participate in decision-making.
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1.1 Empirical Substantiation of and Further Reflections on the
Polar Factors Constituting Corporate Actors
In this section I ask, after briefly referring to neo-corporatist struc-
tures, if the criteria proposed above for identifying corporate actors
pass a reality-fit test. For this purpose I use two controversial cases.
The examples are chosen in such a way as to consider again the 2
polar factors constituting a corporate actor and yet found to be
problematic: constitution and membership.
1.2 Complete Corporate Actors
By the definition advanced in this paper the key actors participating
in neo-corporatist bargaining structures - employee and employer
organizations - could be treated as "complete" corporate actors: they
participate directly in this policy-oriented decision-making, are formal
organizations, have a real constitution and a real membership, pur-
port to represent the interests of their membership, and often have
been challenged for misrepresenting these interests by both internal
and external critics. Their decisions result in the establishment,
maintenance and transformation of rule regimes concerning income-
and/or price-setting, and sometimes even social welfare measures.
Some of these regimes acquire (and lose) a legal status - such as, for
example, Belgian wage and salary indexation. Whether or not legal-
ized, these regimes derive their operative power from the informal
agreement reached by the organizations involved in the decision-
making. Thus, it can be said that neo-corporatist bargaining structures
involve corporate actors to the extent to which they involve formal
organizations, each with their constitution, legitimate domain, vested
resources, and membership, into policy-oriented decision-making
which results in the establishment and transformation of (sometimes
or partly legalized) rule regimes.
The well-grounded observation that "new actors may join while others
drop out, peripheral and core actors can change places, communica-
tion exchange is intensified or discontinued as coalitions emerge and
are transformed" applies also to the neo-corporatist structures, and
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results in rule regime transformations (Mayntz 1986: 20). Such was
the case in Sweden between 1966 and 1973 when public sector
employees and private sector white-collar unions, until then peripher-
al actors, made a bid for a status of core actors, formed new coali-
tions, and established new decision-making arenas, thereby contribut-
ing to the re-assertion of wage-differentials and rules regulating those
differentials in collective bargaining, but also to increased strike
activity and inflation (Olsson/ Burns 1987: 202-205). Such was also
the case in Holland in the 1970s when the trade union members pre-
vailed upon their leaders to drop out from central-level negotiations,
thereby contributing to the greater salience of meso-level negotiations
between unions, employers and government representatives and to
the establishment of regional wage rule regimes (Wassenberg 1982:
96-103). These facts are well-known and in no need of further elabo-
ration. They do not question, only corroborate, the definition pro-
posed here.
1.3 Incomplete Memberless Corporate Actors
However, the issue can be raised if government institutions, partici-
pating in policy-making, should be treated as corporate actors? I
would like to suggest that they should be only so treated when they
have real or presumed specific membership as their point of reference
but in addition pursue "corporate" interests which cannot be reduced
to those of the membership. As I argue next, focusing on Central
Banks - but the same argument could be made about different
government departments -, the Central Banks of Sweden, and Austria
do not have, while those of Belgium, Holland and England do have
such a frame of reference. The latter also pursue "corporate", non-
reducible interests. Consequently, only the latter should be treated as
(complete) corporate actors in the full meaning of the concept as it
has been defined here.9
9 Alternatively, those corporate actors which fulfil only part of
the conceptual requirements could be treated as corporate actors
manque. This would apply to those which engage little in the iden-
tification, but much in the representation of interests or engage much
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Let me formulate up-front my thesis: although a central bank does
not constitute a "complete" corporate actor in a sense that it lacks an
explicit membership, when it is formally or in practice independent
from central government, it nevertheless behaves as if it had a mem-
bership - it attempts to represent the economic interests of the finan-
cial community (and the multinationals) of its own country. For
example, this is the case with the central banks of England and
Holland which behave as if they were formally supposed to represent
the interests of their respective financial communities and as if these
communities had formally vested authority and resources in them.
These central banks actually even have regular contacts with their
"membership", and through these contacts attempt to monitor and
identify the interests of this "membership," but have also been known
to go against these interests (Kurzer 1987: 27; Flam 1986). In contrast,
the central banks of Austria and Sweden are prevented from such a
specific member-interest representation not only by their charters
which call on them to coordinate their policy with the government’s
economic policy but also because the rules for appointment, with-
drawal, and accountability of bank managers and/or supervisors
subordinate them to, respectively, social partners and parliament.
Moreover, even if they had not had such charters, it would be
difficult for them to undertake such a specific member-interest repre-
sentation because of the absence of a distinct financial community -
a "presumed" membership - in their respective countries. Thus, since
they lack both autonomy and even a presumed membership, they
should not be considered (complete) corporate actors.10
Different government departments could be distinguished as to their
type of "corporatedness" (or degree of completeness) relying on the
definitional criteria used here. For example, in most Western countries
the Departments of Defense and of Agriculture seem to engage only
in the identification but little in the representation of interests.
10 One can put the matter differently by turning the tables
around. Swedish and Austrian principals (parliament respectively
social partners) should have no problems controlling their agents
(central banks) because these have no distinct clientele which could
attempt to influence their interests.
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in the representation of interests of groups for whose interests they
are responsible. To outside observers at least, their interests seem to
be reduced to those of their clientele - farmers and the military. The
reason for this could be that this clientele is (relatively speaking)
rather homogeneous. On the other hand, the Foreign Affairs Depart-
ments seem the most independent from interests and the most able
to formulate goals unrelated to those interests. In the area of foreign
economic policy, this could have to do with the (relatively speaking)
great number of heterogeneous and contradictory interests at stake.
It could very well be that the very multiplicity and the very frequent
shifting of interests involved (which makes neither coalition-forma-
tion nor redistributive politics possible and which makes regulative
politics very difficult to conduct) that creates the optimal conditions
for the near-independent corporate interest identification (Lowi 1963).
In the area of international politics, it is not only the multiplicity of
interests but also the rule of secrecy which to a considerable extent
protects the Department of Foreign Affairs from undesired home-
based interventions by concerned interests.
It is also worth mentioning that a given government department may
emphasize different aspects of its corporatedness depending on the
arena in which it participates. Some arenas may call for and facilitate
interest representation, while others favor autonomous corporate
interest generation. For example, at home a department minister may
be called on to formulate departmental (cum corporate) interests in
an innovative way to achieve an interministerial interest-accommoda-
tion and to solve pressing national problems. He may, however, find
it hard to respond to such a request and instead emphasize "repre-
sented" interests since his insistence on defending the "represented"
interests helps him to guard his personal and departmental stake in
a (greater) share of the state budget for which he competes with his
colleagues. However, in an international forum, such as the EC, he is
free to represent the concerned national interests in his area of
departmental responsibility. This applies also to member-created
corporate actors which can play down their representational functions
in some decision-making settings but not in others. For example, in
parliament representatives of political parties are supposed to engage
in interest-representation, but in the insulated parliamentary commis-
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sions they can engage in new interest generation (and interest-inter-
mediation and conflict-resolution11) because these are protected from
the scrutiny of both the public and the member eye by the secrecy
rule or its equivalent.
It should also be noted that issue-salience and issue-intensity affect
which aspect of their constitution corporate actors such as govern-
ment departments have to emphasize or de-emphasize. Since issues
go through their cycles, this means that time plays an important role
in affecting which corporate role - (corporate) interest generation or
interest representation - is more heavily emphasized. For example,
until the 1970s emergence of the anti-nuclear movements, govern-
ments and governmental departments (industry, energy or environ-
mental) responsible for the development and organization of the
nuclear energy sector could emphasize interest generation and interest
intermediation within the narrow confines of the sector. However,
once the anti-nuclear movement became involved in the contestation
of the nuclear energy policy, the same departments and governments
were under heavy pressure to respond. They at least purported to
take on the representation of this emergent anti-nuclear interest at
some stage of the conflict between the nuclear industry and the
movement (Kitschelt 1982; Nelkin/ Pollak 1977; OECD 1979; Flam
1991, forthcoming). This suggests that when issues are salient and
intensely felt, it may be difficult for corporate actors involved in their
handling to insulate themselves from the interests that demand
representation, and, therefore, to engage in interest generation (and
problem-solving) even in insulated arenas sheltered by secrecy. In
fact, what typically happens is that these insulated and sheltered
arenas are supplemented by relatively accessible and open arenas at
least for some time during the ongoing conflict (OECD 1979).
This is then to say that some government bureaucracies (and even
member-created corporate actors) may be very stable and others very
unstable in what aspects of their corporate constitution they empha-
11 Swiss grand coalition government calls on party representa-
tives to forsake party interests in this arena and to engage full-
heartedly in conflict-solution.
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size. At the one extreme, we can imagine departments dealing only
with publicly non-salient issues, always in secrecy-guarded arenas,
and almost completely insulated from the interest groups. These
would be corporate actors which are free to identify and articulate
only corporate interests. At the other extreme, we can imagine
departments dealing only with salient issues, always in unguarded
arenas and under the pressure of a single interest group. These
would be corporate actors which cannot but represent interests. These
two types of government departments would always remain incom-
plete corporate actors. In between these two extremes are government
departments which display a great variability in emphases depending
on the number of interests they are to represent, the type of arena in
which they happen to act, and the time when they act. The very
nature of their "incompleteness" would change as dictated by contin-
gency.
1.4 Incomplete Constitutionless Corporate Actors
Let me now consider a case of another potential corporate actor, one
which lacks not a membership but a formal constitution - a social
movement. Recent research on, for example, energy forecasting and
anti-nuclear oppositional movements shows that social movement
experts as well as nonexpert movement representatives often manage
to assume a place in a decision-making policy network - initiate
policy process through media-amplified issue-formulation, gain
research funds either from their own members or other sources,
produce independent research reports, and attempt to engage other
policy-makers in a multilogue (Burns/ Flam 1987; Flam 1991, forth-
coming). Not as a rule, but often enough, they gain various degrees
of influence over the decision-making process and contribute to
policy-oriented rule regime transformation, whether in the form of a
completely new set of rules (policy reorientation) or of the activation
of rules until then neglected and considered unimportant (Preglau in
Flam 1991, forthcoming).
I would like to suggest that a movement in order to qualify as a
corporate actor should, according to the definition proposed here, be
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interested in the pursuit of and possess power, and, by the same
token, contribute to rule regime making and transformation. It should
not suffice to formulate issues, gain entry and win a formal member-
ship status within a policy network or in a decision-making setting to
be labelled a (strong) corporate actor (de Man 1987; Rucht/ Rüdig/
van der Heijden/ Flam in Flam 1991, forthcoming).
If this argument is accepted, then we can limit our attention to such
movements or parts of the movements which are interested in power,
actively participate in (policy-oriented) decision-making and contrib-
ute to rule regime establishment, maintenance, and transformation,
and ask explicitly whether those without a formal constitution should
be excluded. One argument against such an exclusion follows Cole-
man. Since the creation of corporate actors is to be understood as a
solution of a collective action problem - it is a device meant to
foreclose the exit and to set up the loyalty option - constitutionless
social movements can be treated as corporate actors to the extent to
which they exhibit structures and relations similar to those character-
istic of already incorporated social movements or of formal organiza-
tions. They can be said to possess informal constitutions to the extent
to which they articulate a set of expectations and/or criticisms
regarding the division of labor and authority between the movement
representatives (including experts) and the membership. These expec-
tations and criticisms can be used as an analytical point of departure,
just like a formal constitution would be in an equivalent study of the
tense internal principal-agent relationship in a corporate actor.
Another argument for including power-interested and decision-making
social movements can be derived from the sociology of organization
and, in particular, from the "loosely coupled systems" approach
(Weick 1976). This approach sensitizes us to the fact that even so-
called formal organizations, often rather than being strictly and
hierarchically organized often exhibit weak sub-system coordination.
Many contemporary movements have much in common with this
type of formal organizations. They also are composed of weakly
coordinated and regulated sub-systems with their "own identity and
physical and logical separateness" (Weick 1976: 3). Like these organi-
zations, they are comprised of sub-units which aim to achieve the
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same goal with different means or adopt the same means in the
pursuit of slightly different goals. They also find it difficult to rely on
authority, i.e. a system of positions, offices, responsibilities, opportuni-
ties, rewards and sanctions, as a coupling or coordination mechanism.
However, the point is not to multiply parallels between social move-
ments and loosely coupled formal organizations. It is only to further
support the argument that these movements should not a priori be
excluded from a corporate actor analysis.
If this argument is accepted, then it could be further argued that
movements - just like government departments - vary in the extent
to which they can represent movement interests. An ideal-typical
image of a movement is that of a homogeneous membership, respon-
sive leadership, and formal or informal structures which insure that
this leadership truly represents member-interests. But, in fact, many
movements deviate strongly from this ideal image and are loosely
structured and heterogeneous (Flam 1991, forthcoming). For such
movements a question can be posed if the representation of member-
interests is possible at all, given the fact that it is difficult to define
it in the first place.12
However, it could be argued first of all that, when coordination and
check mechanisms are only weakly developed, the "represented"
interest actually approximates the movement or member interest as
understood by those leaders and groups assuming or usurping
representative functions from within the movement. Second, it could
be argued that both government structures which encourage specific
types of political mobilization and organizational forms while discour-
aging others, and the actions of policy-makers who choose particular
leaders and groups for negotiations and consultations while ignoring,
confronting or suppressing others contribute to the selection of
movement interests, i.e. to the shaping of the contents of the "repre-
sented" interest. Precisely because a movement is heterogeneous and
12 One approach equates a movement with a core cognitive basis
shared by its disparate component parts (Cramer/ Eyerman/ Jamison
1987). Another looks at the shared value-systems and moral milieus
(Nedelmann 1986).
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coordination and check mechanisms are weak or lacking, conflicts
about disparate means-and-ends schemes or about what is being
represented as movement interests may neither become strong nor
much affect the actions of the leaders. Mutual tolerance may exist
between the component parts of the movement and since, as long as
the government structures offer multiple channels of access, the felt
need for common decision-making is low, lead to no intramovement
conflicts (cf. March/ Simon 1958: 121; Wiesenthal 1990: 86-88).
However, just like for government departments, so for movement
representatives it holds that the issue-cycle phase determines just how
homogeneous the membership in fact is as well as how much it is
willing to pressure the leaders to act as its representatives. Moreover,
the degree of insulation of an arena determines how aware the
membership is of what the leaders undertake. It could be argued that
first when the issue is intensely felt (and becomes paramount among
other issues advanced by a movement) and the arena is open to
public scrutiny, the membership may be both willing and able to
exercise pressure. Second, when scarce resources have to be allocated
or joint decisions to be made, as it is often the case when the move-
ment groups or leaders engage in interactions with the representatives
of government or set up a common fund, the membership may feel
both motivated to press and come into conflict with each other and
the movement representatives about the contents of the "represented"
interest as well as about the allocation and decision rules (cf. Simon/
March 1958: 122-123; Flam/ van der Heijden in Flam 1991, forthcom-
ing). Given loose structuring, the only weapons the membership may
have at its disposal may be the appeal to a shared set of values and
participation in a common moral milieu, but one should not underes-
timate the power of such weapons (Nedelmann 1986).
2. The Emergence of Corporate Actors
The Michels’ thesis directs our attention to the internal power strug-
gles within member-created formal organizations and pinpoints
internal elites as groups responsible for that member interests are not
Flam: Corporate Actors 21
adequately represented or that the original purposes informing the
establishment of a corporation are no longer pursued. An extension
of this thesis, shared by those discussing corporate interests and
power, is that corporate actors seek more power because they want
to realize their interests or seek power for its own sake (cf. Coleman
1974; Schneider/ Werle 1990; Aldrich 1979: 207-211, Scott 1981: 41-
43, 307). In any case, these assumptions associate the acquisition of
new purposes by a corporation (goal displacement) with the interest
of an intracorporate elite or a bureaucratic organization in the self-
maintenance.
The following case studies focus not so much on the shift in pur-
poses (goal displacement) as on the upward transfer of powers or
competences within various corporate actors.13 They question the
widely shared assumption that organizations always or unproblemati-
cally breed oligarchies. Instead, they point out that such upward
transfer and accumulation of corporate competences can take place on
a demand of rather powerless members or on an outside corporate
demand or even be a completely unintended outcome of the princi-
pal-initiated upward transfer of power to the reluctant agents. By the
same token, the pursuit of new corporate goals (goal displacement)
can no longer be solely attributed to the presence of internal oligar-
chies, but rather to the development of new interests among corpo-
rate membership, outside corporate demand, or a changing environ-
ment in which old competences acquire new significance and scope.
In their turn, the counter-case studies amplify similar themes, but, in
addition, they pinpoint some of the difficulties, such as principled or
13 This excludes goal displacement and new goal acquisition
under external pressure which occurs without the upward transfer
of competences, i.e. does not bring about an internal shift in power
relations, decision-making and control functions (cf. Aldrich 1979: 14-
16). This also excludes such goal shifts which an organization insti-
tutes when attempting to sustain its organizational existence or to
differentiate itself from others in order to capture a new domain or
new shares in a domain but which do not involve an upward transfer
of competences within this organization (cf. Aldrich 1979: 211, 217, 68-
69).
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interest-based opposition to power centralization, attendant upon the
process of the upward transfer of corporate competences both within
the focal and the outside corporate actors interested in the corporati-
zation of the focal actor. Along with the case-studies, they help to
develop the thesis that, when (further) corporatization is pursued by
relatively powerless corporate members, a tacit or negotiated cross-
system coalition-formation is necessary in order for a successful
corporatization of a focal corporate actor to take place. Such a suc-
cessful coalition-formation with an outside corporate actor(s) is
predicated upon the condition that the internal transformation of the
focal actor does not constitute a competence threat to the outside
actor(s) or that such a threat is neutralized by the shared interest in
domain protection and/or regulation.
Case-Study 1: Corporatization on Corporate Actor Initiative through
a Strong Partner Coalition-Strategy: The EC-Commission’s Transforma-
tion into a Corporate Actor in the Telecommunication Policy Area.
Here we have a case where an initially weak corporate actor develops
autonomous interests and, in order to create a rule regime congenial
to the realization of these interests, seeks out allies and builds cross-
system coalitions to achieve increased power which makes it possible
to realize these interests (Schneider/ Werle 1990). The actor is the EC
Commission, composed mainly of the Ministers of Industry or Eco-
nomic Affairs, which in the mid-1970s became interested in creating
a common European market in telecommunication and, therefore, in
acquiring new competences for the EC Commission. The opponents
to its further corporatization were some of its members and, in
particular, the ministers of PTTs (postal services, telegraphs and
telephones) in different European countries whose competences would
be reduced to the same extent to which those of the EC Commission
would be strengthened. CEPT (the European Conference of Postal and
Telecommunications Administrations), providing a forum for postal
and telegraph administrations interested in a cooperative rule regime
leaving single PTT Ministers’ national domains intact, belonged also
among the corporatization opponents.
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Thus, a relevant policy actor-set or actor-configuration in the telecom-
munication-area included those actors interested in a shared corpora-
tive rule regime which would help to facilitate the creation of a
common European market, but, would entail transfers of power to
the EC, i.e strengthening it as a corporate actor, on the one hand, and
those interested in a shared regulative rule regime which would not
intervene with national monopolies and power competences, on the
other.
The point is that the focal actor - the EC Commission - some of
whose members were interested in the strengthening of its position,
did not know in advance where to look for potential coalition part-
ners. Nevertheless, over time it managed to form both successive and
overlapping coalitions with the EC Council, the European Court, the
European Parliament, and the Heads of the States. It came to rely on
their backing in a conflict against the CEPT and the individual
ministers of Post and Telegraph. In any event, the Commission’s
"success" in turning itself into a regime-formulating corporate actor
depended crucially on its ability to form both internal and across
system-boundaries coalitions with the actors dominant in their domain
- within the EEC (European Economic Community) and with the
Heads of State. Because the coalitions across system boundaries were
with the actors who in their systems had the superior authority, the
Commission could in the end outmaneuver the reluctant PTT heads
and the CEPT. The Commission took care, however, when possible,
to coopt CEPT, as when it installed "a group of experts to develop a
common strategy in cooperation with ministers of industry, postal
administrations and representatives of the telecommunications indus-
try" (Schneider/ Werle 1990: 92).
A threefold shared interest of all EC countries defines their organiza-
tional boundaries and the nature of the outsiders: to benefit from a
larger European market, to defend European states against competi-
tion from equals (Japan and the U.S.), and to protect developed
against developing economies (maintain prerogatives in relationship
to "inferiors"). This is the structural context in which the relevant
actor-configuration - the EC - is found(ed). The shared interest
legitimates divesting nation-states from certain powers and vesting
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them in the corporate actor EC instead. When situational opportuni-
ties arise, such as for example the U.S. telecommunication regime
break-down moving the competitive threat of the AT&T (American
Telephone and Telegraph Company) and the IBM to Europe, this
shared interest can be activated and dramaturgically played up to
legitimate further action(s) whose effect is a further power transfer
from national to EC authorities. Thus, a shared interest in domain
defense can neutralize the individual interests of member-states in
maintaining their own competences intact and in keeping the corpo-
rate actor they had created weak - this was the key to the acquisition
of new competences by the EC Commission in the telecommunica-
tions domain.
Case-Study 2: Corporatization as an Unintended Consequence of an
Inside Demand: The Bank of England and its Stockholders in the
1870s
Corporatization, or to be more exact, the acquisition of new responsi-
bilities, areas of competence and new instruments of control by a
corporate actor, may occur as an unintended outcome and against
the will of the corporate leaders. It may take place when corporate
leaders agree to assume new responsibilities faced with a membership
threatening to endanger the very existence of a corporate organization
and/or when both operate in an ever changing, unforseen environ-
mental context.
From the 1844 Bank Charter Acts until its nationalization after World
War I which did away with private shareholders, the Bank of En-
gland functioned as a both public and private bank with a built-in
tension between its public and private roles which even the formal
separation between its banking and issue departments did not allevi-
ate (Ingham 1984: 235-239, 282). Its 1844 charter confirmed it as the
monetary authority with centralized note issue in its hands, but, by
tying the note issue to the gold reserves, the same charter "deliberate-
ly attempted to reduce the role of the Bank to that of the operational
(as opposed to strategic) management of the monetary system"
(Ingham 1984: 237).
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Tying the note issue to the gold reserves under the management of
the Bank made the Bank the top candidate for the role of lender of
last resort. However, the private activities (and profits) of the Bank
would suffer if it had to keep gold reserves rather than convert them
into liquid capital and lend it at a profit (Ingham 1984: 238). There-
fore, its directors refused to accept the notion that the Bank should
act as lender of last resort. However, it finally reluctantly assumed
this role under the City’s - its stockholding members’ - threat to
withdraw its deposits if the directors did not accept this responsibili-
ty.
The result was that, when Britain assumed the role of a world banker
to the international system, the Bank was compelled to extend both
its activity scope and the areas of competence to monitor and manage
not only the domestic but even the international banking and mone-
tary system. It also had to extend its lending activities to the interna-
tional system. Finally, apart from periodically restricting note issue, it
had to impose deflationary measures through the manipulation of the
discount rate in order to preserve first the domestic and later the
international gold standard. Its representatives acted unequivocally as
defenders of the international gold standard until the 1920s and
1930s; of sterling as an international reserve currency until 1958,
when it became fully convertible into other currencies for non-resi-
dents; and of sterling’s inflated value until 1967, when it finally
became devalued for the first time. (Ingham 1984: 204-207, 239). As
Ingham notes, these developments "were almost wholly unintended,
and not without irony. The intention had been to create an automatic
self regulating system of free money and capital markets beyond the
reach of conscious direction by the state or other powerful interests",
yet the result was the emergence of a powerful corporate actor
(Ingham 1984: 238). Even after the renunciation of the gold standard,
until this day, the Bank operates with an almost complete autonomy.
Neither the City, nor the state, "not even the Treasury /has/ any
control over how the Bank /manages/ its own affairs" (Ingham 1984:
282).
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Case-Study 3: Corporatization on Outside Demand: The Swedish LO
Transformation into a Corporate Actor
Here we have a case of a successful corporatization of a mass organi-
zation under outside pressure. The causal path here again goes from
articulated interests to more power but, in this case, the power is
desired not for an already corporatized actor but for his opponent
cum negotiation partner. The already corporatized actor believes that
to realize his interests he has to cause power centralization in his
opponent. The opponent - to realize his interests - finally gives in to
the outside pressure, although only few of its leaders and members
see corporatization as necessary. A tacit coalition between the already
corporatized actor and these leaders and members makes the corpora-
tization of the as yet uncorporatized actor possible. Again, as in the
case of the EC-commission, the external threat to a domain, posed by
another corporate actor - the state - which could use the conflict
between domain occupants to enter and regulate it, helps to motivate
corporatization opponents to opt for corporatization.
Already when The Swedish Central Employer Association (SAF)
formed in 1902, it possessed power to call general lockouts, adminis-
ter member fees and the special member-support-fund, and make
policy decisions (Bresky et al. 1981: 23-31).14 SAF also had the right to
decide whether a SAF member engaged in a conflict was entitled to
SAF’s economic protection. Finally, it compiled a central blacklist and
a worker register - SAF’s members were forbidden to hire blacklisted
workers and advised against hiring those who were included in a
worker register.
In contrast, the outspokenly democratic Swedish Central Employee
Association (LO), founded in 1898 to protect unions locked out by
employers, had an intentionally decentralized power structure (Bresky
et al. 1981: 26, 41; Olsson/ Burns 1987: 185). It had no mandate to
14 For example, it could decide to provide an annual contribu-
tion to an apolitical worker union (Svenska Arbetarforbundet), plan
and implement anti-socialist propaganda activities in Sweden, and
develop international contacts.
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call or support union strike initiatives - this right remained with the
individual unions. Moreover, the trade unions had the right to
negotiate wages with SAF on workers’ behalf and their members had
the right to annul these agreements by vote. LO’s role was limited to
gathering statistics and providing economic support to individual
unions engaged in defensive actions.
When LO and SAF met at a labor-peace conference in parliament in
1928 to discuss cooperation, Sweden was still one of the most labor-
conflict-ridden Western countries, averaging 500-600 conflicts a year
in the 1920s (Bresky et al. 1981: 41-47). SAF demanded that LO
should acquire the same competences that SAF already had, including
the right to make authorized and non-reversible agreements with
SAF. SAF had an ally in, for example, The Association of Textile
Workers (ATW) which shared SAF’s view that centralization should
replace direct democracy, albeit for different reasons. While SAF
thought centralization was necessary to introduce labor peace and to
imbue the LO members with a spirit of class cooperation, ATW
thought that it would help in using LO as a weapon against SAF.
Under SAF’s pressure, the leadership of LO began considering LO’s
centralization, but the real impetus towards centralization came when
the SD took power in 1932 and a government investigation concerned
with conflicts endangering social peace concluded in 1935 that deci-
sion-making powers should be vested in LO. SAF and LO were both
afraid of outside (state) regulation of the labor market, both wanted
to defend their autonomy in relationship to the state. Allied against
a common foe, LO and SAF started their own negotiations about
measures necessary to insure peace on the labor market in 1936, in
which SAF again pressed LO to centralize. From 1937 on, LO orga-
nized collective agreements with its member trade unions about
wage-levels and contract-acceptance. In 1938, in addition, the well-
known Saltsjobad-agreement was signed between LO and SAF which
helped LO leadership to motivate why LO’s charter should be refor-
mulated and why an internal LO-investigation should look into this
matter. The conclusions of the LO-investigation were presented and
accepted at the LO’s congress in 1941. The new mandate gave LO the
right to represent workers’ interests, to negotiate with SAF, and to
intervene in union activities when they jeopardized the central agree-
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ments. Individual unions encompassing more than 3 percent of LO
members could no longer call a strike without LO’s permission.
Likewise, those unions which refused to accept central wage agree-
ments risked to lose access to conflict-funds. LO, in contrast to SAF,
still did not possess the right to call strikes.15
Counter Case-Study 4: Resisted Corporatization on Outside Demand
in the Field of German Environmental Policy
Since the case of corporatization cum centralization on external
demand has received so much attention through the neo-corporatist
approach, and the transformation of movements into interest groups
constitutes a virtually taken-for-granted wisdom, it is worth emphasiz-
ing perhaps that one important precondition for this kind of corpora-
tization is the existence of a will to power - an interest within the to-
be-corporatized actor in such a corporatization (Schmitter/ Lehm-
bruch 1978; Lowi 1971). In the Swedish LO-case just described the
Association of Textile Workers, for example, formed a tacit coalition
with SAF and the Social Democratic government, and, thus, helped
to bring the centralization about. Even though some voices for
centralization were heard within LO already years before the 1941-
congress, it took a long time, and the pressure of both SAF and the
Social Democratic government, before LO sacrificed its principled
internal democracy for the sake of social peace and a greater effec-
tiveness in wage-negotiations. Similarly, in the EC-Commission’s case,
a coalition between some PTT ministers and other EC and national
15 Similarly, the Swedish Employer Association (SAF) demanded
in 1952 that the Swedish Central Employee Association (LO) act as its
negotiation partner or no index agreement which unions wanted
would be made (Olsson and Burns 1987:188). When the unions again
tried to go back to decentralized negotiations in 1957, they achieved
poor results and LO was again forced to represent the unions against
their will: "SAF managed to close the ranks of its members and hold
a united front against the unions, particularly ... Metal and Building
... which were somewhat opposed to central negotiations. SAF suc-
ceeded in making clear to LO and its member unions that their best
alternative was to support central negotiations. This was the backdrop
for the 25 years of centralized negotiations between LO and SAF for
the private sector" (Olsson/ Burns 1987: 188).
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actors supporting a new rule regime formed against those PTT
ministers who opposed its creation. The formation of this coalition
was a necessary precondition for the further corporatization of the
EC-Commission.
A very good contrasting case is found in the German Bundesverband
Bürgerinitiativen Unweltschutz (BBU). The BBU was created in 1972
as a national organization on the initiative of the German ministerial
bureaucracy responsible for environmental questions and seeking
outside allies. It unified about 1 000 local and regional groups con-
cerned either partially or totally with environmental questions. The
efforts of the German bureaucracy to strengthen and centralize this
organization notwithstanding, the proponents of unification which
would require the transfer of authority up to the central organization
were too few and too weak to assert their interests within the BBU.
Moreover, the informal structure of the BBU made any lasting cross-
system coalition impossible (Schenkluhn 1990: 16-17, 26 fn 43; Rucht
1987).
The dominant coalition within the BBU is perhaps best understood
as "fundamentalist" - bent on preserving decentralization, informality
and independence of different "citizen initiative groups", hostile
towards and mistrusting the established political institutions and,
therefore, not interested in a cooperation with the representatives of
these institutions. The structure of the BBU well reflected the "funda-
mentalist" orientation of its members. Since the BBU was an umbrella
organization with only a rudimentary formal structure,16 the member-
organizations had no procedural rules for the selection of their
representatives to the national congress (Schenkluhn 1988). They either
chose the delegates to the national congress or these self-selected
themselves. Moreover, these delegates could not only freely enter but
also leave representative positions, so that the agreements between
16 Its constitution called for that member-groups should choose
delegates to the member congress and to the work committee every
year and that this congress should in turn choose BBU leaders. Even
if these formal rules were strictly observed, they would not guarantee
stable leadership.
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them and the government representatives had no continued personal
backing. Furthermore, due to the BBU’s lose structure, these delegates
could take initiative and act almost completely uncontrolled by the
members, but when these members mobilized they could annul or
question the initiatives and actions of these delegates. For the German
bureaucracy the problem was that even when these delegates tried to
perform representative functions and did make policy-agreements,
they had neither sufficient formal authority nor the means to bind
their members by these agreements. They could and only did make
action course recommendations. Policies could be enforced only by
the few and far apart (charismatic) delegates.
Under the outside bureaucratic pressures towards centralization, the
BBU became involved in an internal conflict. It never became a
centralized and corporatized coalition partner of the German bureau-
cracy. Some of those within it who supported the type of unification
and cooperation that the German bureaucracy desired joined the
Bund fur Umwelt- and Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND) or other
organizations, after the conflict-ridden BBU fell apart.
What this counter case-study then highlights is the importance of
cross-system supporting coalitions (and some initial degree of formal-
ization) for the emergence of corporate actors.17 Moreover, it nails
home the point that the pursuit of political power and internal
hierarchization are necessary preconditions for the transformation of
17 Corporatization is in turn an important precondition for
political conflict resolution. Interest-mediating and -integrating cor-
poratist politics "is based on the legitimate and binding participation
of peak interest organizations in the political process. It ... presup-
poses that peak interest organizations can assure their members’
compliance with corporatist agreements ..." (Kitschelt 1982: 294).
Where this precondition is lacking - as in French or British trade
unions or most present-day anti-nuclear oppositional movements -
and where "national headquarters have no authority over the politi-
cal actions of their regional membership organizations", neither
political integration nor conflict containment and resolution through
(corporatist or political party) interest aggregation is possible (Kit-
schelt 1982: 294).
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member-created organizations into (rule-regime making) corporate
actors. Where the desire for power is lacking or consciously countered
by a dominant group within an organization, the outside pressures on
a member-created organization to turn itself into a corporate actor
remain ineffective.
Counter Case-Study 5: Resisted Corporatization on an Aborted
Outside Demand in the Field of German Big Science
In the case of the BBU corporatization was aborted because of inter-
nal obstacles: the principled opposition to power-holding and a weak
formal structure unable to insure any continuity in leadership. In the
case of the AGF,18 the Work Group of Big Science Institutes, an
organization founded in 1970 with the purpose of creating a discus-
sion forum for and a political pressure group of the 13 German "big
science" centers, the opposition to a stronger corporatization came
from both inside the initiative-taking Ministry and the initiative-
facing research centers (verbal communication by Uwe Schimank,
02/05/1990).
In the mid-1970s, the Federal Minister of Research and Technology,
faced with increased financial burdens and a strong adherent of the
global steering paradigm current at that time, reflected about a
possibility of bestowing new competences on the AGF. He hoped that
the AGF could assume redistributive functions and help both reduce
and apportion research funds among the 13 big science centers. This
reform-initiative came to naught for two major reasons. First, because
the sections of the Ministry opposed it. Each such section conducts
separate bilateral negotiations with a limited number of the 13
existing research centers. The sections feared that had they merged
into one all-encompassing negotiating section, they would forfeit their
autonomy and lose much control over their respective specialization
domains. Second, because the largest of the 13 big science centers
opposed the reform-initiative. They believed that they stood to lose
the most in the suggested centralized and coordinated negotiations
which would put them under a double pressure, from both the
18 Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Großforschungseinrichtungen.
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Ministry and the smaller research centers, to reduce their demands
for research funds. They believed that in continued bilateral negotia-
tions their chance of competing with the other research centers for
funds was better. Had the Ministry not been divided over this issue,
it could have perhaps helped the smaller research centers achieve a
centralized and coordinated research fund distribution, and, thus, to
become a "dominant coalition" on the AGF-issue. But, since this was
not the case, the largest of the 13 research centers in effect became a
dominant coalition. Their views received cross-system support and,
consequently, came to prevail. And, in reverse, had the research
centers not been internally stratified and, therefore, more inclined to
forsake competitive negotiations for the sake of solidary ones, they
could have brought a concerted pressure on the reluctant sections of
the Ministry and, thereby, perhaps made the Minister and his reform-
initiative "a dominant coalition" within the Ministry. Since this was
not the case, the Minister never formalized his reform-idea and AGF
remained a rather weak corporate actor which legitimates its contin-
ued existence by providing certain services to the big science centers.
3. Some Routes to Corporatization
It is an accepted post-Weberian wisdom that our modern Western
societies are replete with powerful formal organizations that constitute
an excellent breeding ground for other powerful organizations estab-
lishing the rule regimes which order our lives. However, the "breed-
ing process" itself is still hardly understood in terms of the actor-
structure dynamics. The case-material assembled in the previous
section can help to make only a modest step towards the understand-
ing of this process. The question that I will try to answer next is
what are the preconditions of a successful corporatization process - an
upward transfer of decision-making rights and control functions
within a member-created formal organization?
But, first of all, what I would like to suggest is that the formation of
internal oligarchies pushing for further corporatization is far more
problematic than it is often assumed - as the prolonged struggles
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against corporatization within the Swedish LO and the German BBU,
both adherents of principled internal democracy, show. And, as the
case of the BBU in contrast to that of the LO shows, the formation of
oligarchies and the upward transfer of competences are not a fore-
gone conclusion.
Moreover, even when such an oligarchy forms and a rudimentary
corporate actor may be said to exist, it may find it difficult to expand
its decision-making powers and control functions.19 A strategic game
of the leadership for further corporatization is a precarious and
contingent game, dependent on the responses of the membership and
of those corporate actors with whom it interacts. When unsuccessful,
the leaderships ends up either rejected by its members or the outside
corporate actors, or, in reverse, completely dependent on either its
members or these actors.
Let me illustrate using a well-known example derived from neo-
corporatist studies of industrial relations. Under conditions defined by
the interacting organized actors as those of conflictual interdepen-
dence, a negotiation setting presents the union leadership with a
possibility of acting as an intercorporate equal and as a mediator,
who acquires power at the cost of his interaction partners - of both
the union members and the employer or state representatives. Such
a setting presents this mediating leadership with a strategic possibility
of exploiting the dependency of both members and other corporate
actor(s) on its mediating role by playing them against each other,
and, thereby gaining autonomy for itself (Sabel 1981: 209-244; Wassen-
berg 1982: 87-93; Simmel 1950).20
19 This expanded capacity to act, even though it is a creation
of a concrete leader group, remains a corporate attribute. Exactly like
those prerogatives vested in an office are impersonal and transferable,
so those vested in a corporate actor stay as a rule with this actor,
even though the leadership changes. However, the change of guards
may be connected to a dismantling or building up of corporate
prerogatives.
20 When the actor-configuration is a triad or reducible to a triad
- an iron triangle in Jordan’s terms, or a Swedish configuration with
the State, LO and SAF, Simmel’s observations on the domination
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Two distinct developmental trajectories can be identified. If a leader-
ship pursues a problem-solving strategy in the intercorporate negotia-
tions while simultaneously staging "impression management" to
convince its membership that it is engaged in a head-on confronta-
tion, it can bring benefits to the union members without risking to
lose their conflict-motivated allegiance. It is a hard to achieve mixture
of covert problem-solving and overt confrontation which is required
to maintain or increase the credibility of the leaders among these
members.21 If the negotiations are successful, the union members will
be more willing to respond to the leadership’s demands and to
provide it with further resources - to trade off power to these leaders
in exchange for the satisfaction of their power-unrelated interests,
such as union recognition, or higher wages, or job security. This
makes the next negotiating round easier, and facilitates the develop-
ment of a virtuous cycle, wherein it becomes consecutively easier for
the leadership to formulate courses of action, interests, and orienta-
tions which both partially depart from those of the members and
require that more and more authority is vested in the corporate
actor.22
However, if the leadership loses in strategic intercorporate negotia-
tions, that is, cannot deliver benefits and/or stage confrontation, its
credibility among these members will sink, making them less willing
to back it or to vest further authority and resources in a corporate
actor. This makes the next negotiating round more difficult, and
facilitates a development of a vicious cycle, increasing the potential
for the subordination of the leadership to either the membership or
other corporate actors. In the case of such a subordination, the
strategies, such as rule and divide, pivotal party, etc. apply.
21 Such a mixture is the easiest to achieve if both insulated
(conference rooms) and exposed arenas (mass media) are
simultaneously engaged.
22 Indeed, it could be argued that it is in the power interest of
the mediator to forever formulate and identify interests which can be
seen as conflictual by the interdependent parties, since the necessity
for a mediator arises only in the context of interdependent parties
facing conflictual interests.
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corporate actor per se may still have some authority and resources,
but the leadership is only able to utilize them to take care of the
interests of either the membership or of other corporate actors. The
loss of credibility also makes it difficult for the leadership to expand
further corporate actor prerogatives.
The point is that only when a "virtuous negotiation cycle" develops,
the leadership can resist the power claims and interest-formulations
of the members by using (economic or legal) resources acquired from
other corporate actors, and, to resist those of other corporate actors
by using/mobilizing the resources provided by the members, thus
slowly building up corporate power. This pattern has been attributed
to the Swedish industrial relations in the post-World War II period.
In contrast, British, Italian and French industrial relations reflect
rather a vicious negotiation cycle. The union leaders in these coun-
tries have been unable to establish centralized unions as viable
corporate actors.
Thirdly, not the oligarchies or relatively privileged, but the relatively
powerless and privilegeless members may develop an interest in and
push for corporatization. Measured by any standards, the Swedish
textile worker unions, the Ministers interested in a further corpora-
tization of the EC-Commission, the realists within the German BBU,
or the smaller among the 13 big science centers did not qualify as
power-hungry elites at the time when corporatization was an issue.
Yet they were the actors with the most interest in corporatization.
And, interestingly enough, in two cases, that of the Swedish LO and
the EC-Commission, such relatively powerless members indeed
managed to push through further corporatization of the organizations
to which they belonged. The key argument is that they could do so
because they received support from outside powerful corporate actors.
It was the outside support that changed the status of what was a
subordinated coalition on the corporatization issue into a dominant
coalition on the same issue. In both instances, moreover, there was an
apparent threat to the domain in which the as yet weakly corpora-
tized actor pursued its purposes. This threat activated a set of shared
interests in domain protection which neutralized those in the protec-
tion of interindividual status and power differences.
36 MPIFG Discussion Paper 90/11
At the risk of elaborating the obvious, let me systematically consider
the contribution of the outsider - the third - to the corporatization
process. Only when the third is powerful and united in support of
corporatization of another organization at the same time that the
dominant interest coalition within a split organization is both well-
rooted and in favor of corporatization, corporatization has a good
chance of taking place and stabilizing. In contrast, corporatization is
rather unstable and may be reversed in three other situations: a)
when the powerful third and a subordinated coalition within an
organization support it against the will of the dominant coalition; b)
when a subordinated coalition within the powerful third and a
dominant coalition within an organization support its corporatization
against the will of a dominant coalition within the powerful third; c)
when a subordinated coalition within the powerful third and a
subordinated coalition within an organization strive for corporatiza-
tion against the will of their respective dominant coalitions. Logically,
all four routes to corporatization with outside support are possible,
but only the first guarantees the emergence of a stable corporate
actor.
When corporatization is understood as predicated upon successful
cross-system coalition formation, the question of who initiated it -
actors internal or external to the focal corporate actor - recedes
somewhat in importance. Nevertheless, it should be briefly noted that
the observation that corporatization often occurs on external demand
is interesting in itself as it complements the Michels’ thesis. Schmitter
postulated one such external route to corporatization and one major
incorporating actor - the state - in the context of his polemics against
pluralists (Schmitter/ Lehmbruch 1978; Schmitter/ Streeck 1981).23
What can be emphasized here is that not only the state or its agen-
23 Aldrich, summarizing research in the field of organizational
sociology, pointed out accommodation with officials in the target
organizations and coalitions with other organizations seeking similar
objectives as the two strategies the leaders of a member-based
organizations may use to justify shift in purposes and to maintain
their own power positions (Aldrich 1979: 209). These two strategies,
however, are seen as crucial for power-maintenance and not for an
upward transfer of competences.
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cies, but also other powerful corporate actors or actor coalitions,
including employer organizations, such as SAF, or powerful corporate
actors within the EC, are capable of contributing to the lateral cre-
ation of corporate actors in their domain (cf. Aldrich 1979: 69). This
lateral route to corporatization should be clearly distinguished from
that from above instituted by the state and that from below which
involves states, firms, organizations or individuals as corporation-
creating members (cf. Carney 1987; Kenis/ Schneider 1987; Schnei-
der/ Werle 1990).24
3.1 Some Reasons and Preconditions for "Bottom-Up" and
"Lateral" Corporatization
Among the most frequently listed reasons for bottom-up, top-down
and lateral corporatization we find interest interdependence, domain
defense, domain expansion, domain regulation, and conflict resolution
through recourse to negotiations. In the LO- and SAF-case of lateral
corporatization, both domain protection against the state and its
(peaceful) regulation through negotiations was at stake. In the case
of the EC-Commission’s bottom-up corporatization, domain protection
against the US but even its regulation were the issues. Finally, only
domain regulation was at stake in the case of the Ministry of Envi-
ronment and the BBU and the Ministry for Research and Technology
and the AGF - both exemplifying lateral corporatization.
A few generalizations can also be made about the preconditions
which have to be met in order for a successful lateral corporatization
which presupposes bottom-up corporatization to occur. Outside
support for such a corporatization is hard to find when it implies a
threat to the existing office-competences, as the case the Ministry of
Research and Technology show. Faced with such an external opposi-
tion, the focal embryonic corporate actor - the AGF - found it hard
24 In theory, bottom-up, top-down and sideways-across routes
to corporatization and their mixtures are all possible. See Hood’s
work on quangos where these three creation modes are distinguished
in Hood 1986.
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to acquire new competences. Inside support for upward transfer of
competences is hard to realize when it threatens to erode internal
stratification (LO, the 13 "big science" centers) or when it implies the
erosion of competences of the meso- or local-level staff and/or of
member prerogatives (PTT Ministers, LO, BBU).25
Another important obstacle to both bottom-up and lateral corporati-
zation is the presence of alternative routes of goal realization by the
membership forming a corporate actor (cf. Kenis/ Schneider 1987).
When the stratified or differentiated members of a focal corporate
actor are under an outside pressure to transfer competences upwards,
the members who can realize their interests on an individual basis
are in a position to ignore this pressure.26 The case in point is this of
the 13 big science centers. The biggest believed that they stood to
benefit more from the old bilateral than from the planned coordinated
negotiations. They, therefore, resisted the corporatization of the AGF.
Similarly, whenever the splits within SAF and conducive market
conditions permitted, the most powerful of the LO unions have tried
to break away from the centralized negotiations, showing where one
of the weak points of this corporate actor is.27 But even when the
membership is relatively homogeneous in terms of its demands, the
presence of alternatives to corporatization as a viable means of
interest realization, makes it reluctant to opt for corporatization. The
case in point is that of the BBU. Its member organizations engaged
in their regular civic and political activities in their respective locali-
ties and on that level could achieve some of their goals. They were
25 The case of the EC shows that the resistance of some of the
members to the upward transfer of competences can be overcome by
an appeal to and the pressure exercised by their superordinates. But,
the case of the German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology
implies that these superordinates may refrain from applying such
pressure when their subordinates are united in their opposition and,
proportionately, raise the costs of overcoming their opposition.
26 In the case of a firm, an alternative to concerted action with
other firms is to rely on the own amassed resources for individual
competition or on own offensive strategies against the domain
encroacher (Carney 1987).
27 See note 15 on such failed attempts.
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not exclusively dependent on the national umbrella organization for
goal-realization because the federal state structure provided them with
alternative negotiation and political influence channels. In sum, even
when corporatization is not resisted inside an embryonic corporate
actor for principled or domain-protecting reasons, but the membership
sees some of its interests better realized on an individual and others
on a corporate basis and where the alternatives are not foreclosed,
the corporatization process may be initiated but never fully completed
(cf. Kenis/ Schneider 1987). The membership continues to pursue its
interests standing on two feet - the individual and the corporate,
never fully loyal and never quite motivated to take the exit option.
The internal resistance to corporatization may be overcome if the
outside actor constellation both closes ranks and forecloses alterna-
tives, making it very costly for the individual members of the focal
corporate actor not to go along with (further) corporatization (SAF
vs. LO). Foreclosing of the alternatives by an external actor consti-
tutes a functional equivalent of the capacity of an organization to 1)
abolish the exit option (compulsory membership, high exit costs) or
2) establish itself as a monopolistic benefit provider or 3) convert
privately accessible goods into joint goods access to which requires
concerted action (Hechter 1977). The foreclosing of alternatives is
possible when the outside actor constellation can turn itself into a
corporate actor (as in the case of SAF) or form a tight coalition.
However, when the incentives are modest and the costs very high -
as in the case of the German Federal Ministry of Research and
Technology - or when the reform of the entire political system would
be necessary, as in the case of the BBU, where a unitary rather than
a federal German State would have meant foreclosed alternatives, this
route to corporatization of a focal actor is impossible.
Although the case studies at hand are insufficient to develop more
than some incomplete generalizations about different preconditions
of corporatization,28 they can be rounded off with the aid of the
28 Note that all three of the below listed routes do not involve
resource-dependence on an outside actor (the state) which the Schmit-
ter-Streeck route to corporatization involves (Schmitter/ Streeck 1981:
40 MPIFG Discussion Paper 90/11
already existing theories concerning the preconditions for corporate
solidarity, collective action, and internal coalition-building (Hechter
1977; Olson 1965; Scott 1981). The theory of corporate solidarity tells us
that among self-interested individuals it can be best achieved when
these share dependence on each other for joint goods. When, as is
the most often the case, such dependence is not shared in all respects
(i.e. it is unequally distributed among the heterogeneous member-
ship), those less privileged and relatively powerless will be more
interested in (further) corporatization, and will have to overcome the
resistance of their more fortunate fellow-members. However, if they
utilize a threat to their domain to activate a set of latent, shared
interests in domain protection, i.e. manage to demonstrate a case of
interdependence for goal realization, they stand a chance of persuad-
ing even the more powerful and privileged members to go along
with corporatization (Kenis/ Schneider 1987; Schneider/ Werle 1990).
The theory of collective action, in its turn suggests, that those interest-
ed in corporatization would gain support for it from their reluctant
fellow-members if they provided them with selective incentives -
created new types of stratification or differentiation or new meso-
level competences - compensating for the loss of the powers lost to
the corporate actor. This may, but need not, require the extraction of
further resources from the organization or its environment. Howev-
er, in the presence of a threat to a domain and of foreclosed alterna-
tives, the pressure to provide such compensatory selective incentives
to the reluctant members completely disappears. This is so since the
domain threat constitutes a new source of solidarity and the fore-
closed alternatives make impossible the exit option. Finally, the
dominant coalition theory implies, that those interested in corporatiza-
tion could achieve it if they exchanged corporatization in the area in
which they were less privileged and powerful for corporatization in
the area in which they were more privileged and powerful. This last
route to corporatization, since it can cause a spiral of exchanges, is
particularly conducive to a piecemeal but steady upward transfer of
competences to the corporate actor. Of these three routes to corporati-
zation, this implicating a domain threat and that implicating internal
129-132) Nor do they depend on the outside actor’s (the state’s)
ability to make membership contributions obligatory.
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trade-offs most clearly do not depend on external support in any
form, while the route combining foreclosed alternatives with a do-
main threat depends on the cooperation of the external actor(s)
willing to take action resulting in foreclosed alternatives. None of the
three routes to corporatization (through an activated domain threat,
domain threat in combination with foreclosed alternatives, and/or
internal exchanges) necessarily calls for the organization to extract
new resources from its environment.
4. Corporate Capacity to Act and Corporate Power
So far I have focused on the different routes and obstacles to corpo-
ratization. In this last section, the focus is on the interplay between
corporate capacity to act, affected by variations in internal structures,
and corporate power, affected by corporate interactions. After consid-
ering some obstacles to goal realization that different corporate actors
encounter in their interactions with external actors, the section returns
to the focal topic and briefly analyzes the contribution of these
external actors to further corporatization and de-corporatization.
4.1 Corporate Structure and Capacity to Act
By the corporate actor capacity to act I understand its ability to make
and implement decisions. This ability is in turn predicated upon its
internal structures and dynamics. In the following table, major factors,
the location of power and resources, which influence the decision-
making and implementation processes, and together constitute a
corporate actor capacity to act, are presented. The table pinpoints the
sources of internal tension and weakness affecting the overall capacity
to act in three different types of corporate actors; hierarchical (H),
coalition-dependent (CD), and loosely coupled (LC) (Rogers/ Whetten
1982; Scott 1981; Weick 1976) . These three types of corporate actors
can be said to constitute a corporatization continuum moving from
complete corporatization (H) (interest-generating functions only)
through medium corporatization (CD) (both interest-generating and
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interest-representing functions) to a modicum of corporatization (LC)
(representative functions only).










Table 1: Corporate Capacity to Act and Its Major Tension-Sources in Three
Corporate Actor Types
ideal-typical firm or bureaucracy, is between the decision-makers and
the in principle powerless implementing staff. This tension may
compromise its efficient decision-making and instant resource-avail-
ability by slow-downs, friction, and deviations from the professed
goals accompanying the implementation process. Within coordinated,
but decentralized corporate actors, such as most trade-unions and
political parties, but also some international organizations, there is a
tension-potential inherent in the fact that political power is built from
scratch through coalition-formation, while the resources and formal
decision-making powers are vested in an office. The access to the
resources and formal decision-making rights vested in an office is
predicated upon the process of issue-focused coalition-formation
which generates a dominant coalition. The weakness of this type of
corporate actor lies therein that the decision-making and resource-
securing processes are interconnected, and, therefore, prone to stale-
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mates. Since not only goal-definition but also the internal power
relations (access to resources and formal decision-making rights) are
at stake, the emergence of a dominant coalition on a given issue is
time- and energy-consuming and necessarily involves goal-redefinition
to partially accommodate the internal opposition. It also involves
trade-offs, payoffs, and exclusion strategies marginalizing what in
effect becomes a subordinated coalition. To that extent to which the
dominant coalition has been successful in marginalizing and accom-
modating the interests of the opposing coalitions, the implementation
is frictionless. In loosely coupled systems (and movements) power is
vested in the representative function, but (both financial and action)
resources remain in units or members. The weakness of this type of
corporate actor lies therein that the resource-controlling members or
units may annul rather than ratify the decisions made single-handedly
by those assuming or usurping representative functions, making for
decision-reversals. Its second weakness is its very loose coupling and
weakly developed formal structures which, even if decisions were
indeed ratified, slows and hinders the coordination-dependent imple-
mentation process to a considerable extent.
In sum, organizational structures seriously affect corporate capacity to
act. Contrary to the widely accepted notions, however, it is impossible
to posit a simple positive relationship between a high level of central-
ization and a high level of corporate capacity to act. This is so
because capacity to act includes two dimensions - decision-making
and implementation - which stand in reverse relationship to each
other. The more centralized and effective decision-making is (ceteris
paribus), the more likely it is that the excluded implementing staff
in a bureaucracy or a membership in a coalition-dependent organiza-
tion or a movement, may slow down or sabotage the implementation
process. That is why a coalition-dependent corporate actor which is
not very centralized or effective in its decision-making, since it takes
a long time to build a broad dominant coalition, may actually be
more effective in the implementation phase than a hierarchical
corporate actor which makes an efficient, but an unpopular or
controversial decision. Similarly, a few movement leaders may be as
efficient in decision-making as a hierarchical top, but when it comes
to the implementation process, the hierarchy, even given internal
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friction and resistance, will be more effective than a, even most
supportive of its leaders, loosely coupled organization or movement.
4.2 Corporate Interactions and Corporate Power
In the previous section I focused on internal corporate structure - its
locus of power and resources - as a precondition for a corporate
capacity to make and implement decisions. Now I turn to the influ-
ence that external corporate actors exert on corporate power, under-
stood as corporate ability to realize interests even against an opposi-
tion. In this section it is taken for granted that a corporate actor has
emerged and is endowed with some decision-making and implemen-
tation capacities. The key question is how another corporate actor
affects a focal corporate actor’s power to realize its interests. The
thesis is that the corporate structures of two interacting corporate
actors determine to a large extent not only the interaction mode
between these two actors but also a focal corporate actor’s power -
the ability to realize its interests even against external resistance.
As above, in a crude manner, corporate actors can be divided into
(H), (CD) and (LC). The (H)(H) interaction combination generates the
least chaos and the most predictability in decision-making. Goal-
realization in such an actor configuration is an outcome of bargaining
and attendant strategic games. Success in bargaining and strategy
virtually guarantees the ability to realize corporate interests, although
problems may arise on the friction-bound implementation side. In
contrast to the (H)(H) combination, the combination (CD)(CD) defies
the application of a rational choice model, but approximates the
garbage can model. It produces chaos and unpredictability, even
decision-making paralysis, to the extent to which the shifting of
dominant coalitions within the two interacting corporate actors is not
in any way constrained. Nevertheless, this type of chaos and unpre-
dictability can be partially comprehended: conflicts and "problems are
worked upon ... but choices are made only when the shifting combi-
nations of problems, solutions, and decision makers happen to make
action possible" (Cohen/ March/ Olsen 1972: 17) On the implementa-
tion side, the focal corporate actor can expect friction and resistance
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to the extent to which either it or its opponent failed to ground the
decisions to be implemented in their respective organizations. The
most chaos and unpredictability, even non-action, can be expected
from an (LC)(LC) combination: even when decisions (agreements) are
made, they can be reversed by either the focal (LC) actor or its (LC)
opponent, and effective interest realization - implementation - remains
always problematic because of weak enforcing formal structures on
both sides.
It is interesting to note that even the structurally most capable
corporate actor - hierarchical29 - is very likely to find its ability to
realize its interests impeded when compelled to interact with non-
hierarchical actors, even when these support its interests (cf. Rogers
and Whetten 1982). In an interaction with a (CD) actor, the ability to
realize (H) actor’s interests depends in the short-run on the (CD)
dominant coalition - whether or not its resistance can be overcome,
but also on how well-rooted in its organization this coalition is. If it
is not well-rooted, implementation problems may arise. However, the
source of unpredictability in this type of actor configuration is that in
the long run a (CD) actor produces a new dominant coalition, in
which case, a new time-consuming round of negotiations and deci-
sion-making has to start again. The more unstable the (CD) actor, the
more frequent uncertainties about its interests and implementation
capacities are and the more frequent the need to re-open the informa-
tion-gathering phase and the negotiations. In the interaction with an
(LC) actor, decision-reversals within and weak implementation
capacity of an (LC) actor are the greatest impediment to goal-realiza-
tion on the part of an (H) actor. Even if an (H) actor manages to
overcome the resistance of and form agreements with an (LC) actor,
it is still far from goal-realization since the implementation process is
slow and problematic.
Now, the crucial point is that the difficulties encountered in dealing
with non-hierarchical corporate actors can be lessened through
restructuring of corporate actors. If an (H) corporate actor possesses
29 But also (CD) and (LC) actors would encounter similar diffi-
culties.
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necessary resources (organizational slack), it may seek to stabilize a
(CD) and to centralize an (LC) actor as a means to its own goal-
realization. Alternatively, it may expand and differentiate parts of its
own organization (adopt a multi-divisional or loosely coupled form)
to lessen the negative impact attendant a prolonged inability to realize
some of its interests (cf. Wiesenthal 1989: 87-89).
This brief mixed-actor interaction analysis thus suggests that the
nonhierarchical corporate actors, with uneven or slow capacity to act,
are an obstacle to hierarchical actor’s goal realization. An (H) actor
interacting with such non-hierarchical actors is very likely to find it
impossible to realize its interests unless it manages to affect the
restructuring of its interaction partner or restructures and differenti-
ates itself. In the case of corporate restructuring of one’s interaction
partner, we deal with lateral corporatization on "outside demand"
already touched upon earlier. In the case of self-restructuring, we deal
with "de-corporatization" - an entirely new topic, beyond the scope
of this paper. In either case, the main point is that upward or
downward transfer of decision-making rights and control functions
within a corporate actor is a recurring process, stimulated by interac-
tions with other corporate actors which impede interest realization.
Through this process, the original distribution of decision-making
rights and control functions within a corporate actor is modified and
this actor is also freed to some extent from the "genetic code" im-
printed on the original corporate organization by its creators. In this
way, corporate interactions as such contribute to corporate transforma-
tions.
5. Conclusion
The first part of this paper argued for a strict concept of corporate
actors including such dimensions as formal constitution, real member-
ship, interest representation and member-independent corporate
interest generation, and, finally, rule regime making. However, it also
made a case for the inclusion of such organized actors which possess
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only an informal constitution and/or only a "presumed" membership
in the category of corporate actors.
The second part of the paper, dealing with the genesis of member-
created corporate actors and taking departure from the Michels’
thesis, pinpointed the contribution of relatively powerless members,
supported by external corporate actors, to the corporatization process,
but also some of the obstacles found on its way. It also drew atten-
tion to three distinct routes to member-activated or -aided corporatiza-
tion (through a domain threat activating latent sources of solidarity,
domain threat combined with nonexistent exit option, and, finally, an
internal exchange pattern) to account for corporatization independent
of the corporate capacity to extract resources from its environment.
Only the second of these routes involved a supportive external actor
willing to foreclose alternative interest-realization means and, thereby,
to set up conditions conducive to (further) corporatization.
The third part focused on corporate structures as determinants of
corporate interaction modes and differential ability to realize corporate
goals. It also dealt with interactions as determinants of the corporate
ability to realize interests, but also of further corporatization and de-
corporatization. It argued that hierarchical actors interacting with non-
hierarchical actors, making their goal realization difficult, may use
organizational slack to transform either their own structures or that
of their interaction partners.
Among the most frequently cited reasons for the upward transfer of
decision-making rights and control functions within a corporation, i.e.
for the genesis of a corporate actor, are oligarchical or bureaucratic
interests in power and interest interdependence among the potential
or actual organization members, in particular, for domain defense,
expansion or regulation (including conflict resolution). This paper has
argued that the formation of oligarchies is far more problematic than
it is usually assumed and that organization leaders making a bid for
power often lose in a precarious game they play against both the
organization membership and the corporate actors against whom they
represent this membership. Moreover, it pointed out that a corporati-
zation process also may be accomplished by four different cross-
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organizational coalitions. In particular, it stressed that even the less
privileged organization members when aided by outside corporate
actors interested in neutralizing obstacles to their own goal-realization
can both initiate and achieve a successful (simultaneously bottom-up
and lateral) corporatization process. Finally, a corporate actor may
emerge unintentionally as its old competences acquire a new meaning
and scope in the changing environmental circumstances. In sum,
corporatization can be bottom-up, lateral, top-down, unintentional or
mixed.
Keeping all the routes to corporatization in mind, one can say that
corporate capacity to act is very specific insofar as it goes far beyond
actor-generated goal pursuit. It includes not only decision-making and
implementation, but also a restructuring capacity - a capacity to
create, destroy, and block the emergence of corporate actors in one’s
own organization but also in others.
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